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FINALITY IN BROWNFIELDS
REMEDIATION AND REUSE
Joel B. Eisen*
Thirty years after CERCLA's 1 enactment, the brownfields phenomenon
is an anomaly in the statute's complex history. The statute was not
designed to address this problem. Instead, as a near-perfect example of the
law of unintended consequences, 2 it arose after CERCLA was in place, and
dealt with sites purportedly not contaminated enough to be addressed under
it. The statutory net swept in brownfields sites (abandoned or underused
properties, mostly in urban areas) along with highly contaminated sites,
subjecting them to a fear of liability that hampered remediation and reuse
prospects. Since the 1980s, however, state voluntary cleanup programs
(VCPs), federal liability relief, and programs for brownfields developers
have promoted redevelopment activities. 3 After the 2002 Small Business
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (SBLRBRA)4 added
liability protections, 5 brownfields largely faded from the CERCLA
headlines.

* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. Copyright 2011, all rights
reserved.
I. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (2006).
2. See Tom Rath, Deregulation by Any Other Name: New Jersey's Site Remediation
Reform Act in Federal Context, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 332 (2011) (calling brownfields an
"unexpected problem").
3. See Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields at 20: A Critical Reevaluation, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
721, 721-23 (2007) [hereinafter Eisen, Brownfields at 20]; BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 15 (Todd s. Davis & Scott A. Sherman
eds., 3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE].
4. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-118, 115Stat.2356.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-9605, 9607, 9622, 9628 (2006). See Joel A. Mintz, New Loopholes or
•Minor Adjustments?: A Summary and Evaluation of the Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 405-15 (2002) [hereinafter Mintz,
New Loopholes]. The Environmental Protection Agency's All Appropriate Inquiries Final Rule,
promulgated in 2005 under the SBRLBRA, protects brownfield developers if they make "all
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Brownfields' dramatic transformations from vacant or blighted sites to
centerpieces of redevelopment activities have been core components of
urban revitalization efforts. 6 Thousands ofbrownfields abandoned for years
are now being reborn as industrial, commercial, residential and even
recreational sites. Take in a baseball game in Bridgeport, Connecticut7 or a
soccer match at Red Bull Arena in Harrison, New Jersey, 8 or shop or work
at Potomac Yard in Alexandria, Virginia, 9 and you are part of brownfields
redevelopment in action.
The brownfields "problem" looks to be over, done, finished. Today, it
merits little more than a few pages of attention in leading books on
CERCLA. ' 0 But nothing is ever final in CERCLA, and, to quote Yogi
Berra, brownfields "ain't over 'til it's over." 11 Many issues that arose at the
outset of heightened concern about brownfields in the 1980s are still present
today. By all accounts, many brownfields have not been addressed at all,
and states have not done enough to ensure that sites that have been cleaned
up don't backslide. 12 In a parallel to ongoing concerns about CERCLA
enforcement, the primary challenge is ensuring that there are proper

appropriate inquiries" (including environmental investigation and remediation activities, if
necessary) before acquiring ownership ofbrownfields sites. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 312 (2012).
6. See U.S. EPA, INVESTING IN PARTNERSHIP, POSSIBILITY, AND PEOPLE: A REPORT TO
STAKEHOLDERS FROM THE U.S. EPA BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM 31 (2005) [hereinafter EPA,
INVESTING IN PARTNERSHIP, POSSIBILITY, AND PEOPLE] (discussing successful revitalization
efforts). For a European perspective, see Bernard Vanheusden, Brownfield Redevelopment in the
European Union, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 559 (2007) and GERNOT PAHLEN, RESCUE:
REGENERATION OF EUROPEAN SITES IN CITIES AND URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 8 (Sept. 8, 2004).

7. See Brownjields Fact Sheet: Bridgeport's Restored Gateway Leads to a Whole New
Impression, U.S. EPA, http://nepis.epa.gov/EP A/html/Pubs/pubalpha_B.html (describing
Bridgeport's brownfields redevelopment activities).
8. The Harrison project is one example of New Jersey's Brownfield Development Area
(BOA) Initiative, a program that attempts to address multiple brownfields in the same location.
See U.S. EPA, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS: AN UPDATE
FROM THE STATES 16-17 (2011), available at http://epa.gov/brownfields/state_tribal/update201 l/
bf_states_report_2011.pdf [hereinafter EPA, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE
PROGRAMS]; News Release, N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, Dep Playing Big Role in KickStarting Red Bull Soccer Stadium, Revitalization of Harrison Waterfront (Mar. 23, 2010),
available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/newsrel/201Oil0_0019.htm.
9. See One and Two Potomac Yard, NAT'L INST. OF BUILDING SCI. (2012),
http://www.wbdg.org/references/cs_potomac.php (stating that remediation was overseen by the
EPA with a "no further action" letter issued by the EPA and the Virginia Department of
Environmental Quality).
10. For example, in JOHN s. APPLEGATE & JANG. LAITOS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: RCRA,
CERCLA, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS w ASTE 266-69 (2006), the authors addressed
the problem in only four pages.
11. YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 157 (1998).
12. See Rath, supra note 2, at 327.
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oversight resources. 13 It should surprise no one that states often are
reluctant to pay much attention to a problem they think they have "solved,"
even if it is demonstrated that is not completely true. 14
Environmental justice advocates and others have demonstrated the
need to involve the public in planning for the future at brownfields sites, 15
and while public input is increasingly part of brownfields remediation and
reuse, it is not always meaningful. 16 Another trend of the past two decades
is the emergence of a broader land use planning agenda centered on
sustainability, and its intersection with brownfields laws and policies. 17 As
one report observes, "Communities will succeed in brownfields
revitalization when they consider these properties as community and
economic opportunities that happen to have an environmental challenge,
and connect brownfields initiatives to their broader community vision and
revitalization priorities." 18 This responds in part to the challenge of climate
change, which was less well known at the time most VCPs began. To
many, brownfields now "take center stage in a sustainable planning strategy
of thwarting sprawl, preserving open space, reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, and reinvesting in urban areas and their communities." 19
The intersection of brownfields redevelopment and these broader
concerns presents a host of issues. Does redevelopment of brownfields
connect to a larger vision for the city that links with "smart growth" and
climate action goals? Retooling the original developer-centered vision of
VCPs to promote broader goals is an ongoing challenge. Has the affected
community been involved in planning for brownfields remediation, or has
the developer controlled the process? The latter narrows the ability to view
13. See Joel A. Mintz, EPA Enforcement of CERCLA: Historical Overview and Recent
Trends, 41 Sw. L. REV. 645, 657-58 (2012).
14. See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 722.
15. See generally Clifford Rechtschaffen et al., Environmental Justice: Law, Policy and
Environmental Protection, SEATTLE U. SCH. OF LAW LEGAL PAPER SERIES# l 0-24 (2009).
16. See Joel B. Eisen, 'Brownfields of Dreams'?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary
Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 998 (1996) [hereinafter Eisen,
Brownfields ofDreams].
17. See John Dernbach, Creating the Law of Environmentally Sustainable Economic
Development, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 614, 615 (2011) (discussing "renewable energy
technology, green infrastructure, recycling, brownfield redevelopment, and other forms of more
sustainable economic development"); Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 187, 189-90 (1999) [hereinafter Eisen, Brownfields Policies for
Sustainable Cities].
18. NAT'L Ass'N OF LOCAL Gov'T PROF'LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., UNLOCKING
BROWNFIELDS: KEYS TO COMMUNITY REVITALIZATION 6 (2004).
19. JUSTIN B. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELD REGENERATION: CLEANUP,
DESIGN, AND REUSE OF DERELICT LAND 2-3 (2010) [hereinafter HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES
OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION].
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the project as part of a community-wide plan, and undermines its
legitimacy. Finally, if brownfields redevelopment yields benefits, how can
we measure success over the long term? Metrics for assessing this are only
just now emerging.
As I note in Part III, many key questions have incomplete answers
today, and as a result, finality in brownfields remediation and reuse
continues to elude us. I draw a number of examples from New Jersey, a
Rust Belt state with many brownfields and a complex history of dealing
with them. 20 Recent developments in that state, including a 2009 state
statute that privatized cleanups, 21 and well-publicized funding shortfalls and
regulatory errors in 2011, 22 highlight the challenges of contemporary
brownfields redevelopment.
I.

THE BROWNFIELDS "PROBLEM"

"Brownfields" are abandoned or underused sites that the SBLRBRA
defines as "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which
may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant."23 The United States has perhaps
400,000 to as many as one million brownfields, 24 although reliable
information is hard to come by. 25
These sites are found throughout the nation, but urban brownfields
such as abandoned steel mills or other manufacturing facilities, and
formerly grand railroad stations now idle, 26 attract the most attention. 27
20. For discussions of New Jersey's site remediation programs, see generally Alexander
Maro, Outsourcing the Filth: Privatizing Brownfield Remediation in New Jersey, 38 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 159 (2011); Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3; Rath, supra note 2, at 336-42.
21. Site Remediation Reform Act of 2009, ch. 60, 2009 N.J. Laws 476 (codified at N.J.
STAT. ANN.§ 58:10C-l-29 (West Supp. 2012)).
22. See Christopher Baxter, N.J. to shut down state initiative intended to help clean up
'brownfields,' NJ.COM (June 2, 2011, 7:57 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/06/
nj_to_shut_down_state_initiati_l.html [hereinafter Baxter, N.J. to shut down state initiative].
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (2006).
24. U.S. GOV'T ACCT. OFFICE, BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT: STAKEHOLDERS REPORT
THAT EPA'S PROGRAM HELPS TO REDEVELOP SITES, BUT ADDITIONAL MEASURES COULD
COMPLEMENT AGENCY EFFORTS I (2004). See also NAT'L Ass'N OF LOCAL Gov'T PROF'LS. &
NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 3; Brownfield Projects, NEW JERSEY ENVIRONMENTAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TRUST (2010), http://www.njeit.org/brownfield.htm.
25. See KRIS WERNSTEDT ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, VOLUNTARY
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS AT CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES 17 (2010), available at
http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-dp-10-18. pdf [hereinafter WERNSTEDT ET AL., VOLUNTARY
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS]. New Jersey alone may have more than 10,000 brownfields sites.
Brownfield Projects, NEW JERSEY ENVIRONMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE TRUST, supra note 24.
26. See KRIS WERNSTEDT ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE BROWNFIELDS
PHENOMENON: MUCH ADO ABOUT SOMETHING OR THE TIMING OF THE SHREWD? 7 (2004),
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Some make up a brownfields variant of "orphan sites"28 : former owners are
gone, and cities or other public entities now own them. 29 They have often
had numerous owners and histories of industrial or commercial use, but
have not been touched for years. 30 Without environmental investigations, it
is often difficult to discern the extent of contamination or need for
remediation, let alone whether sites would be dangerous enough to qualify
for the National Priorities List ("NPL"). 31
Brownfields sites may have advantages over other locations. They
often sit near railroads, highways, other forms of transportation, and the
bulk of cities' populations. 32 Yet developers often have the choice of
foregoing them altogether for greenfield sites in suburbs and exurbs. 33 The
cost of redeveloping a brownfield can be higher than that of a greenfield
site. 34 This is not universally the case, however. If the greenfield site has
been previously developed and requires rehabilitation of its own, that might
negate the cost advantage, 35 and if the infrastructure at the brownfield site is
usable, that might help narrow the cost disadvantage. 36
Brownfields redevelopment has numerous potential benefits. 37 As the
EPA puts it, "Revitalizing brownfield sites creates benefits at the site and

available at http://www.rff.org/rf£1documents/RFF-DP-04-46.pdf [hereinafter WERNSTEDT ET AL.,
THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON].
27. See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 725-26.
28. See WERNSTEDT ET AL., VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS, supra note 25, at
14-15 (noting that over 50% of surveyed brownfields were vacant at the time of entry into a VCP).
29. See JUSTIN B. HOLLANDER, POLLUTED & DANGEROUS: AMERICA'S WORST
ABANDONED PROPERTIES AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THEM 2-4 (2009).
30. See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 725.
31. See Eisen, Brownfie/ds ofDreams, supra note 16, at 929-30.
32. See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One Piece of the Puzzle: Why State Brownfields
Programs Can't Lure Businesses to the Urban Cores Without Finding the Missing Pieces, 51
RUTGERS L. REV. 1075, 1093-94 (1999); CHARLES BARTSCH, COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A RESOURCE BOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES ch. I, pt. l (1996), available at
http://www.nemw.org/
images/stories/docurnents/cmclean.pdf; Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 890-92.
33. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 10; Eisen, Brownfields
ofDreams, supra note 16, at 891-92.
34. Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfie/ds, 21 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 265, 277-281 (1997) (discussing the cost disadvantages ofbrownfields).
35. James Boyd et al., The Effects of Environmental Liability on Industrial Real Estate
Development, 12 J. REALEST. FIN. & ECON. 37, 37-38 (1996).
36. Evans Paull, The Environmental and Economic Impacts of Brownfields Redevelopment,
32 (NE-Midwest Inst., Working Draft for Distribution, July 2008), available at
http://www.nemw.org/images/stories/documents/EnvironEconlmpactsBFRedev. pdf.
37. See, e.g., JUDITH AUER SHAW ET AL., MEASURING BROWNFIELD SUCCESS IN NEW
JERSEY: How DATA INCREASES OUR COMPETITIVE EDGE 20-22 (2008), available at
http://www.policy.rutgers.edu/brownfields/projects/success.pdf.

778

SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

throughout the community."38 Building on urban sites, with their existing
footprints and infrastructure, can alleviate sprawl by decreasing the need to
consume greenfield lands. 39 According to a 2001 study, redeveloping one
acre of brownfields can conserve as much as an average of 6.2 acres of
greenfields. 40 Brownfield redevelopment can be an effective component of
a climate change policy if it spurs a decrease in commuting and therefore in
vehicle miles traveled,41 as transportation accounts for the nation's second
largest share of GHG emissions. 42 Other potential benefits include
reductions in storm water runoff and air pollution,43 and increased property
values in neighboring areas. 44 At five revitalized sites, the EPA found a 32
to 57 percent reduction in vehicle miles traveled, a 47 to 62 percent
reduction in storm water runoff, and a 2-3 percent increase in adjacent
property values. 45
In the mid- to late-1980s, some began to argue that a major challenge
to brownfields redevelopment (and perhaps the most prominent one) was
the stigma from the possible presence of environmental contamination. 46 A
1992 Congressional field hearing in Ohio saw the first use of the term
"brownfield,"47 in contrast to pristine "greenfield" sites. Many claimed
reform to CERCLA and other laws was indispensable to removing the
"brown" stigma. 48 This fear of liability was overstated, as it turned out that
the vast majority of brownfields sites were not contaminated enough to
38. The EPA Brownjields Program Reduces Widespread Environmental and Economic
Benefits, U.S. EPA (Sept. 2012), http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/ove1view/Brownfields-Benefitspostcard.pdf [hereinafter EPA, Brownfields Benefits].
39. See JONATHAN P. DEASON ET AL., PUBLIC POLICIES AND PRIVATE DECISIONS
AFFECTING THE REDEVELOPMENT OF BROWNFIELDS: AN ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL FACTORS,
RELATIVE WEIGHTS AND AREAL DIFFERENTIALS § 8.1 (2001), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-eem/Brownfields/project_report/report.htm; Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra
note 3, at 750; Paull, supra note 36, at 5.
40. DEASON ET AL., supra note 39, at§ 5.3.
41. See Paull, supra note 36, at 5.
42. DAVID L. GREENE & ANDREAS SCHAFER, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
FROM U.S. TRANSPORTATION 2 (2003), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/reducingtransportation-ghg.pdf.
43. Paull, supra note 36, at 17-20; NAT'L Ass'N OF LOCAL GOV'T PROF'LS. & NE.MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 101, 104.
44. Paull, supra note 36, at 29-30.
45. EPA, Brownfields Benefits, supra note 38.
46. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 7-8.
47. Office of Health, Safety & Sec., U.S. Dep't of Energy, The Brownjields Solution,
OPERATING EXPERIENCE SUMMARY 3, I (Feb. 28, 2009), http://www.hss.energy.gov/sesa/
analysis/oesummary/oesummary2009/2009-02-03.pdf; Jonathan D. Weiss, Local Governance, in
STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 683, 683 (John c. Dembach ed., 2009) ("The word
'brownfields' was not even in the dictionary in 1992; it achieved that honor in 1999.").
48. See BARTSCH, supra note 32, at ch. 1, pt. I.
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wind up on the NPL. 49 It also gave CERCLA greater prominence than it
deserved among other barriers to urban redevelopment, such as changes in
consumer preferences or residential patterns. 50
Still, there was something to the fear of liability. Throughout the
1980s, courts gave the EPA more power under CERCLA to investigate and
remediate sites, and to the EPA and private parties to fasten liability on
PRPs. 51 CERCLA's broad liability provisions capture a wide group of
entities, whether or not they did any actual waste dumping. Attempting to
evaluate brownfield sites might subject developers to liability because
owners and "operators" are jointly and severally liable under CERCLA,
whether or not they owned the sites at the time of disposal. 52 Therefore,
assuming serious contamination was discovered, a developer might face the
full price tag of CERCLA remediation even if it did nothing to cause the
contamination there. 53
Developers balked at becoming involved with brownfields, fearing the
worst. 54 Remediation costs could not be quantified ahead of time, 55 and
even after investigations, knowing cleanups' price tags would be difficult.
CERCLA cleanups cannot be priced in advance, because remediation is a
lengthy process that includes (among other requirements) compliance with
ARARs-requirements of other environmental laws. 56 And if merely
investigating the conditions at a brownfield site, let alone making decisions

49. See BROWNFJELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 4-5; Eisen, Brownfields
ofDreams, supra note 16, at 90 l.
50. See SHAW ET AL., supra note 37, at 2-4 (discussing the issue generally and listing the
seven principal categories of barriers to brownfields redevelopment found by researchers at
George Washington University in 2001).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2006).
52. CERCLA imposes liability on "the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility," which
applies to current owners without regard for whether they owned sites at the time of disposal of
hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (2006). See also Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams,
supra note 16, at 90 l.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The plain
language of section l 07(a)(2) extends liability to owners of waste facilities regardless of their
degree of participation in the subsequent disposal of hazardous waste."). See also ELIZABETH
GLASS GELTMAN, RECYCLING LAND: UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF
BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT 53-54 (2000); Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 90 l;
Robertson, supra note 32, at 1084.
54. See Boyd et al., supra note 35, at 37.
55. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 8-9; Eisen, Brownfields
ofDreams, supra note 16, at 906-07.
56. BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 124. See Eisen, Brownfields
of Dreams, supra note 16, at 907-09; Robertson, supra note 32, at 1089; NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL
Gov'T PROF'LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 124.
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about how to remediate them, might' expose a developer to liability, it was
easier to shun the site.
Amendments to CERCLA and EPA policies aimed to lessen
developers' burden, but were largely unsuccessful. The 1986 SARA
amendments 57 added an "innocent landowner" defense designed to protect
those, like brownfields developers, who purchased sites after waste
dumping took place, and were therefore not responsible for contaminating
them. 58 However, this defense was not widely used, because meeting its
requirements was difficult. 59 Those seeking to prove their innocence had to
demonstrate that they had engaged in "all appropriate inquiry" before
purchasing a site. 60 Most courts retained liability for prospective purchasers
who had not discovered the contamination before purchasing the sites,
reasoning they probably had not done enough investigation. 61
Thus, rather than protect brownfields developers, the innocent
landowner defense's shortcomings led many to claim more CERCLA
reform was needed. 62 Brownfields advocates sought partnerships with
environmental agencies rather than adversarial enforcement-based
relationships, shorter cleanup processes with more certainty (including
releases or other forms of indicating that the brownfields purchaser would
not face liability), and lesser cleanup standards that in some cases would
allow less costly means of addressing contamination at the site (for
example, so-called "institutional controls" such as fences and warning
signs). 63
States hit hardest by the recession of the early 1990s tended to be the
ones with the most brownfields. 64 Difficult economic conditions added to
the increasingly widespread concern that CERCLA (and its state analogues

57. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2006)).
58. See SUSAN OPP & SARAH HOLLIS, CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES: HISTORY,
REGULATIONS, AND RESOURCES FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS 6 (U. Louisville Ctr. for Envtl.
Pol'y & Mgmt., 2005).
59. See L. Jager Smith, Jr., CERCLA 's Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis or Mirage?, 18
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155, 156-57 (1993).
60. See id. at 159.
61. See Larry Schnapf, The New "All Appropriate Inquiries" Rule, THE PRACTICAL REAL
ESTATE LAWYER, Jan. 2007, at 10.
62. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 59.
63. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 948. See also John Pendergrass,

Institutional Controls in the States: What Is and Can Be Done to Protect Public Health at
Brownfie/ds, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (2003).
64. See U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, RECYCLING AMERICA'S LAND; A NATIONAL REPORT ON
BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT 10 (1993-2010) (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.
usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/november201 Obfreport.pdf.
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created in the 1980s) were holding back productive investments. 65 This
prompted calls to remove barriers to redeveloping cities, 66 in which
CERCLA was no longer seen as a force for good, but as one of those
barriers. Any remediation and reuse activities at urban brownfields were
thought to be preferable to continued neglect, even if they did not comport
with CERCLA's rigid remediation requirements. 67
II.

BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT IN THE STATES, AND FEDERAL
LIABILITY PROTECTION

While brownfields developers were said to fear CERCLA liability, far
more sites were subject to the cleanup requirements of state CERCLA-like
analogues. 68 Several states in the Northeast, including New Jersey, also had
separate property transfer laws requiring evaluation (and remediation if
necessary) of potentially contaminated sites prior to their transfer. 69 Given
this legal environment, the states became primary drivers for brownfields
redevelopment. 70 Between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, many states
overhauled their environmental cleanup and property transfer laws, creating
VCPs to promote brownfields redevelopment. 71
According to one recent estimate, state VCPs have addressed more
than 50,000 brownfields sites, and evaluate another 7,000 - 8,000 sites each
year. 72 "Voluntary" indicates that the process begins when developers
approach the states to commence remediation and reuse activities. 73 The
regulatory climate aims to create a working relationship between state
regulators and developers, and is sharply different from CERCLA's

65. See CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COLLATON, BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND
REUSING CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES 2, 19 (1997).
66. See BARTSCH, supra note 32, at ch. 1, pt. I.
67. See NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL GOV'T PROF'LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at
11.
68. See WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON, supra note 26, at 2;
BARTSCH & COLLA TON, supra note 65, at 5, 18.
69. See Eisen, Brownjields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 915; BROWNFIELDS: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 795-96; BARTSCH & COLLATON,supra note 65, at 17.
70. See BARTSCH & COLLATON,supra note 65, at 5, 19.
71. See Eisen, Brownjie/ds at 20, supra note 3, at 721; Maro, supra note 20, at 171-73
(describing New Jersey's program).
72. Paull, supra note 36, at 5.
73. BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 11. See also Eisen,
Brownfie/ds ofDreams, supra note 16, at 920-21.
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enforcement-driven model. 74
VCPs typically include three central
attributes: 75
Streamlined administrative processes: In VCPs, the steps between
identification of a site as one to which the program will apply, and final
remediation and reuse, are far less in number and shorter in duration than in
enforcement-driven models. 76 Often, developers are put in control of many
steps of the process (in some states, by hiring licensed environmental
professionals to administer the entire cleanup). 77
Risk-based cleanup standards: In VCPs, the end use to which sites will
be put (such as commercial, industrial, or residential) is factored into the
risk assessment of the sites, leading to standards that typically require less
than complete remediation. 78 Often, developers can cut costs by adopting
remedies such as entombing soils at brownfield sites rather than removing
and treating them. 79
Liability protection: States offer a number of means for developers to
secure protection against future enforcement actions by their environmental
agencies, ranging from "no further action" letters (statements of intent that
developers would not face liability in the future) to full releases from
liability. 80
In states such as New Jersey, licensed environmental professionals
often decide cleanup levels within defined parameters. 81 New Jersey's 2009
Site Remediation Reform Act ended the previous Voluntary Cleanup
Program and devolved cleanup decisions to licensed professionals. 82
Licensed professionals may issue "Remedial Action Outcome" documents
certifying completion of remediation activities without prior approval from

74.

See David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of Democracy?, 14

N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86 (2005).
75. Eisen, Brown.fields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 886-87; Robertson, supra note 32, at
1101-07. BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE: THE CLEANUP & REDEVELOPMENT OF
CONTAMINATED LAND (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2006) contains a list of individual state programs.
76. See Eisen, Brown.fields ofDreams, supra note 16, at 920 n.180, 970.
77. Id. at 965-70; Maro, supra note 20, at 181.
78. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 936-38.
79. Id. at 948.
80. Id. at 950-58.
81. See Brownfield Site Contamination, N.J. INST. OF TECH., http://www.njit.edu/
tab/managing/pre-development/contamination-investigation.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
82. See Maro, supra note 20, at 180-82 (describing the Licensed Site Remediation
Professionals scheme); JAMES PETERSON, THE ROLE OF THE LICENSED SITE REMEDIATION
PROFESSIONALS (2011), available at http://www.slideshare.net/JamesPetersonLSRP/the-role-ofthe-lsrp-in-brownfields-remediation.
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the Department of Environmental Protection. 83 This process takes these
critical decisions out of the hands of state environmental authorities, and
84
relies on quality control of the professionals to ensure proper results. This
"outsourcing" may provide brownfields developers with the state liability
protection they seek, but provides no government's guarantee that they have
undertaken proper remediation activities. 85
Federal liability, of course, is another matter altogether. Before 2002,
developers could obtain protection against state liability by completing
remediation activities in VCPs, but there was no exemption from CERCLA
liability. 86 Even though states could not protect developers against federal
liability, their releases were typically viewed as sufficient comfort to
proceed with redevelopment activities. 87 There was some federal activity
on the liability front. States negotiated with the EPA to create memoranda
of understanding that gave some protection to sites addressed in their VCPs
without a full release from liability. 88 The CERCLA innocent landowner
defense and some federal programs, such as the EPA's guidance on
"prospective purchaser agreements," provided limited protections. 89
After the SBLRBRA's enactment in 2002, the prospect of CERCLA
liability receded. The SBLRBRA provided a prospective purchaser
exemption from CERCLA, which the EPA subsequently issued regulations
to clarify. 90 The EPA regulations require the prospective purchaser to allow
access to and cooperate with regulators, 91 and exercise care in dealing with
the prior releases of contaminants at the site so as not to exacerbate the
problem. 92 The new law also restricted actions under CERCLA against
developers who remediate sites in VCPs. 93

83. Site Remediation Program, N.J. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, http://www.state.nj.us/
dep/srp/ (last updated Oct. 9, 2012). See also Maro, supra note 20, at 181-82; EPA, STATE
BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 16-17.
84. See Peterson, supra note 82, at 13-39 (describing the "commandments" for LSRPs).
85. See Maro, supra note 20, at 180-82; Rath, supra note 2, at 337.
86. See NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL Gov'T PROF'LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at
83.
87. See id.; Eisen, Brownjields ofDreams, supra note 16, at 950-58.
88. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSNE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 52; Eisen, Brownfields
of Dreams, supra note 16, at 964 n.348.
89. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSNE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 52; Eisen, Brownfields
ofDreams, supra note 16, at 982-83.
90. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 83.
91. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 312 (2012).
92. See id.; Mintz, New Loopholes, supra note 5, at 406, 412; Schnapf, supra note 61, at 1011.
93. See Mintz, New Loopholes, supra note 5, at 420.
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Ill. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO "FINALITY"

The SBLRBRA provided liability protection, but did not bring finality
to the brownfields problem. One challenge is simply that many sites have
not been addressed. While large urban brownfields have been reused, other
sites sit neglected. According to one recent estimate, states have only
successfully dealt with 1% to 2% of all brownfields sites. 94
A VCP traditionally deals with each site on its own, and remediation
and reuse plans often have no requirement to relate to any comprehensive
plan for urban redevelopment. 95 There are exceptions to this, as some
American cities eschew parcel-by-parcel redevelopment in favor of more
systematic redevelopment approaches. 96 However, finality demands a
broader approach than is currently employed at many sites.

A.

Relationship to Smart Growth and Climate Action

A brownfields project should fit within an overall plan of development
for the affected community, with the community viewing the economic,
environmental and institutional elements in a framework that considers all
impacts and not just those of remediation. 97 One problem, as noted above,
is the parcel-specific nature of brownfields redevelopment. 98 New York
and New Jersey have area-wide brownfields initiatives, in which regulators
attempt to address multiple brownfields in the same community. 99 It has
been noted that, "[i]n contrast to site-specific remediation, the area-wide
approach of the [New Jersey] BDA provides a framework that addresses the

94. EVANS PAULL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF BROWNFIELDS slide 11
(2009), available at http://www.nalgep.org/ewebeditpro/items/093F 18694.pdf.
95. Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 225, 227.
96. See, e.g., U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, supra note 64, at 9.
97. See WILLIAM SARNI, GREENING BROWNFIELDS: REMEDIATION THROUGH
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 84-85 (2009); CHRISTOPHER DE SOUSA, BROWNFIELDS
REDEVELOPMENT AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABILITY 265-272 (2008) (Current Research in
Urban and Reg'! Studies, vol. 3).
98. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
99. D. Evan van Hook, et al., The Challenge of Brownfield Clusters: Implementing a MultiSite Approach for Brownfield Remediation and Reuse, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 113 (2003);
Brownfield Opportunity Areas Program, N.Y. DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERV., http://www.dec.
ny.gov/chernical/8447.htrnl; Brownfields Development Area (BDA) Initiative, N.J. DEP'T OF
ENVTL. PROT., http://www.state.nj.us/dep/srp/brownfields/bda/. See Nicholas Capuano, Silent
Blight: New York's Brownfields & Environmental Justice, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 811, 812
(2003). See also Maro, supra note 20, at 174-79 (discussing the BDA Initiative).
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larger physical, political and social contexts of an affected community." 100
The EPA has called for more "area-wide planning among areas and
corridors of brownfield sites," 101 selecting twenty-three communities for
grants to develop area-wide plans. 102
In one encouraging development, there are active links between the
"smart growth" movement and brownfields redevelopment. 103 "Smart
growth" refers to the myriad of "creative strategies to develop in ways that
preserve natural lands and critical environmental areas, protect water and
air quality, and reuse already-developed land," which stand in opposition to
the existing patterns of "sprawl" -centered development. 104 However, the
fact that brownfields projects use existing urban land and, at times, some
existing infrastructure, does not necessarily make that growth "smart." 105
There are many opportunities for smart reuse of brownfield sites that
would not only conserve greenfields acreage but also deploy green
technologies to reduce carbon emissions and produce other benefits. 106
Some sites have been transformed into urban greenways. 107 An intriguing
new use of brownfields sites is for renewable energy facilities, 108 including
so-called "brightfields" 109 locating solar panel arrays and wind turbines at

100. Kris Wernstedt & Jennifer Hanson, Areawide Brownfield Regeneration Through
Business-Based Land Trusts and Progressive Finance, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL'Y, 7 (2006),
available at http://www.Jincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1096_Wernstedt_complete_web.pdf.
101. EPA, Brownfields Benefits, supra note 38.
102. Brownfields Area-Wide Planning Pilot Program, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
brownfields/areawide_grants.htm.
103. See Patricia E. Salk.in, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads of a
National Land Use Policy, 36 VAL. L. REV. 381, 391-92, 396-97 (2002); Smart Growth and
Brownfields, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/piedpage/brownfields.htm.
104. See About Smart Growth, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/about_sg.
htm; Sustainability Depends on Curbing Urban Sprawl, Resource Drain and Overall Waste,
SMART GROWTH ONLINE, http://www.smartgrowth.org/engine/events.php/2010/news-26.
105. Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 749-50.
106. See SARNI, supra note 97, at 86; PETER CALTHORPE, URBANISM IN THE AGE OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 106 (2010); Greg Lewis, Brown to Green: Sustainable Redevelopment of
America's Brownfield Sites, NE.-MIDWEST INST.: CENT. FOR POL'Y INITIATIVES,
http://www.nemw.org/images/issues/brownfields/2008-12-26%20%20Green%20brownfield%20issue%20brief.pdf.
107. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, at 86
(discussing the Assunpink Greenway in Trenton, NJ).
108. See Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 281-82,
299-301 (2011); Steven Ferrey, Converting Brownfield Environmental Negatives into Energy
Positives, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 417 (2007); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Renewable
Regional Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 510 (2011).
109. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, at
54-55.
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urban sites. 110 Using green design and construction techniques in
overhauling existing buildings at a brownfields site may conserve energy
and feature sustainable building materials and creative waste reduction
strategies. 111 The LEED certification system for sustainable buildings
awards points for building on a brownfields site, and adds points for
variables like building close to existing transportation systems. 112
An evolving long-term trend involves planning activities that explicitly
connect brownfields with actions to address climate change. 113 Local
sustainability or environmental quality departments are integrating
brownfields redevelopment with community-wide land use planning
efforts. 114 Climate action plans (such as those developed in Portland and
Cincinnati, which discuss the role of brownfields redevelopment 115) can be
excellent tools for integrating brownfields redevelopment planning in a
city's climate change response.
Although there has been much progress in this area at brownfields
sites, "there is still room and need for further experimentation and
implementation of sustainable and green methodologies." 116 That could
serve as a summary of the relationship between greentech and brownfields
redevelopment at present: much has been accomplished, but there are still
considerable opportunities. Some form of evaluative approach will also be
necessary to determine whether brownfields policies meet the criteria
outlined in climate action plans. 117

110. Abby Gruen, N.J. Senate passes role for solar and wind development on brownfie/ds,
NJ.COM (Aug. 23, 2010, 5:05 PM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ss£'2010/08/
nj_senate_passes_rule_for_sola.html; Brockton Brightfie/ds, CITY OF BROCKTON, http://www.
brockton.ma.us/govemment/departments/Planning/BrocktonBrighfields.aspx (describing the
Brockton Gas Works project).
111. See, e.g., LEED Green Building Rating Systems, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL,
https://new.usgbc.org/leed/rating-systems; Green Building, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGCY., http://
www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/.
112. LEED Green Building Rating Systems, supra note 111.
113. See Paull, supra note 94, at slide 17.
114. One of many examples is Asheville, North Carolina's Office of Sustainability. See
Sustainability, CITY OF ASHEVILLE, N.C: OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY, http://www.ashevillenc.
gov/Departments/Sustainability.aspx.
115. See City of Portland and Multnomah County Climate Action Plan 2009, CITY OF
PORTLAND BUREAU OF PLANNING AND SUSTAINABILITY, (Oct. 2009), http://www.
portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/268612; Climate Protection Action Plan: The Green Cincinnati
Plan, CITY OF CINCINNATI, 201-02 (Jun. 19, 2008), http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/
oeq/assets/File/climate_protection_action_plan. pdf.
116. Lewis, supra note 106, at 15.
117. Ronell Auld et al., Assessing Brownfield Sustainability: Life Cycle Analysis and Carbon
Footprinting, W. PA. BROWNFIELDS CTR., (2011), http://www.cmu.edu/steinbrenner/brownfields/
Current°/o20Projects/sustainability.html.
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Community Participation

Brownfields remediation and reuse often "dramatically impact[s] the
health and economy of the nearby communities," 118 and community
planners have therefore viewed participation of the affected community as
critical to a brownfields project's success. 119 As one report observes,
"Community involvement and consensus is one of the most important
ingredients for a successful brownfield project." 120 Different actors may
have diverging ideas about the ideal plan for transforming an urban
brownfield site, 121 and public involvement in the process can bring a wider
focus on community redevelopment than that of a developer. 122 Discussing
a number of successful projects since the 1990s, the EPA has observed that,
"By creating a dialogue among all stakeholders in a brownfields project,
community engagement enhances the final reuse of the property and the
long-term success of the project." 123 Public participation in brownfields
redevelopment also recognizes the central concern of environmental justice
advocates 124 that sites are often in areas of cities where residents have
"traditionally been left out of the planning process," 125 and community
outreach can address the political marginalization of these residents.
Yet to many developers, economic concerns are paramount. 126 For this
reason, the initial design of many VCPs empowered developers to fix the
extent of public input in decision-making at brownfields sites. 127 This is a
sharp distinction between this process and the CERCLA model, where
extensive public participation in cleanup activities is mandatory. 128

118.

Building Capacity: Brownfields Redevelopment for Community·Based Organizations,

NAT'L. CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & BROWNFIELDS REDEVT, l-1 (Apr. 2008).
119. Daniel M. Speiss, Public Participation in Brownfields Cleanup and Redevelopment: The
Role of Community Organizations, 1-2 (2008) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan),
See EPA, STATE
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/60850/1/dspiess_l.pdf.
BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 12, 17; U.S. CONF. OF
MAYORS, supra note 64, at 9, 10.
120. NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL GOV'T PROF' LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 6.
121. See Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 202.
122. See SARNI, supra note 97, at 84-85.
123. Building Vibrant Communities: Community Benefits of Land Revitalization, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGCY., 2 (Oct. 2009), http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/policy/comben.pdf.
124. Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 219-229 (discussing
the link between brownfields and environmental justice, and proposing solutions such as
"Community Working Groups").
125. Speiss, supra note 119, at 35.
126. WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON, supra note 26, at 4-5.
127. See Eisen, Brownfie/ds ofDreams, supra note 16, at 998, 1000, 1002-03, 1005, 1008.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (2011) (describing the public participation requirements).
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Although VCPs do not typically require public participation,
developers are increasingly working with affected communities to garner
support for individual projects. 129 Unfortunately, even when developers
conduct public meetings or other means of involvement, the level of
participation can fall far short of meaningful input. 130 In many cities, there
are no obvious stakeholders to voice concerns of residents near brownfields
sites, let alone engage in discussions with developers that have already
committed to moving projects forward. 131 Designating or forming a citizen
"steering committee" or other community-based group can lead to enhanced
public participation and a wider focus on community redevelopment,
particularly if that organization is an existing group that has knowledge and
expertise in the affected community. 132 Regardless of the means chosen to
provide for public input, the challenge remains at many sites and in many
cities to allow affected communities to have a meaningful say in the future
of brownfields projects. 133

C. Evaluation ofSite and Program Results
In 2011, news reports pointed to numerous shortcomings in the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) assessments of the
1,600 sites awarded grants under the state's fund for brownfields
remediation. 134 Officials did now know, for example, whether the sites had
ever been developed for the specific purposes identified in the grants. 135
The DEP's Commissioner subsequently criticized these reports, calling the
program a "national model" and stating that, "the DEP and EDA closely
track exactly how much HDRSF money is being spent on each brownfields
project through a rigorous process that includes thorough technical and
financial reviews." 136 This fell short of addressing all of the critics' claims,
and highlighted a larger problem present in New Jersey and many other
129. See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 224.
130. Speiss, supra note 119, at 32. See SARNI, supra note 97, at 85.
131. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 282.
132. See HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19,
at 88; NAT'L CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 118, at II.

133. BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 283.
134. Christopher Baxter, N.J. officials didn't track the $281 M spent from brownfields fund to
clean polluted properties, NJ.COM (July 31, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://www.nj.com/news/
index.ssf/2011 /07/nj_officials_say_they_failed_ t.html.
135. Id
136. Bob Martin & Caren Franzini, Turning N.J. brownfields green again, NJ.COM (Aug. 15,
2011 7:24 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2011/08/turning_nj_brownfields_green_a.
html.
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states: while a large number of projects have been processed through state
VCPs, there is little adequate analysis of the results. 137 The VCP process
focuses on the present day problem of transforming an abandoned or
underused site into a locus for commerce, and, as a result, has not focused
on impacts of site redevelopment after initial remediation and reuse
activities. m
To date there has not been much "systematic, careful documentation of
actual practice at a wide range of [brownfield] sites," 139 and states do not
have formal processes in place to evaluate sites over time. 140 Years after
VCPs have been operating, research is finally underway to assess long-term
impacts, 141 but adequate methodologies are not in place. In particular, it has
been noted that, "methods and estimates for quantifying life cycle impacts,
especially climate change mitigation associated with Brownfield
development, do not currently exist." 142 States should do more to address
this shortcoming of understanding the impacts of brownfields
redevelopment in affected communities.

D. Public Investment in Brownfie/ds Sites: Critical But Often Lagging
In a high-profile "miss," the New Jersey DEP announced in summer
2011 that the fund it administers to provide funding for assessment and
remediation of brownfields sites had run out of money. 143 Projects in the

137. See SHAW ET AL., supra note 37, at iii.
138. See W. Pa. Brownfields Ctr., About the Western Pennsylvania Brownfields Center,
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., http://www.cmu.edu/steinbrenner/brownfields/About/index.html;
WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON, supra note 26, at 18.
139. NAT'L Ass'N OF LOCAL GOV'T PROF'LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 9-10;
WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON., supra note 26, at I. See Richard c. Hula
& Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, Cleaning Up the Mess: Redevelopment of Urban Brownfields, 24
ECON. DEV'T Q. 276 (2010) ("Although [brownfields] programs are often perceived as having a
positive impact, there is remarkably little evidence beyond anecdotal examples to support such
claims.").
140. See Auld et al., supra note 117; WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON,
supra note 26, at 6.
141. SHAW ET AL., supra note 37, at iii (listing specific proposals relating to measuring
impacts of brownfields projects in New Jersey).
142. W. Pa. Brownfields Ctr., Assessing Brownfields Sustainability, CARNEGIE MELLON
UNIV., http://www.crnu.edu/steinbrenner/brownfields/Current%20Projects/sustainability.htrnl.
143. The fund in question is New Jersey's Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund
(HDSRF), funded through a business tax. Baxter, N.J. to shut down state initiative, supra note 22;
Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund, N.J. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., (last updated June 27,
2011 ), http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/finance/hdsrf/.
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pipeline totaling $71 million were suspended, leaving their future in
doubt. 144
This highlights a major challenge of current brownfields policy. Public
support (including funding for site assessment and other purposes) is often
critical for the success of brownfields redevelopment. 145 Initiatives at all
levels of government target remediation and social, economic, institutional,
and other aspects of brownfields reuse. 146 Public involvement begins at the
very start of the process. In many communities, interest in brownfields is
low, and this is especially true for small brownfields or those in cities with
"little interest from developers and a lack of knowledge on how to proceed
with redevelopment." 147 Localities and prospective developers interested in
brownfields reuse often must also address capacity and management
issues. 148 Developers can find the brownfields redevelopment process
overly complex. 149 Matching developers with opportunities to remediate
and reuse brownfields requires careful planning, for example, by employing
marketing approaches and designating local officials as contact points to
navigate complex approval processes. 150
Public funding can be an important factor in a project's success.
Developers can obtain resources for a site's evaluation, remediation and
reuse from a wide variety of federal and state agencies. 151 As Table 1
indicates, state grant, loan, training and education programs, and tax and
other financing incentives support brownfields redevelopment. 152 At the
federal level, the EPA implemented the SBLRBRA with federal grants and

144. Baxter, N.J. to shut down state initiative, supra note 22; Broke Brownfield Fund is Bad
Policy, says Sierra Club, NJTODAY.NET, (June 16, 2011), http://njtoday.net/2011/06/16/brokebrownfield-fund-is-bad-policy-says-sierra-club/.
145. See Broke Brownfield Fund is Bad Policy, says Sierra Club, supra note 144.
146. SARNI, supra note 97, at 42-43.
147. W. Pa. Brownfields Ctr., USEPA Training, Research, and Technical Assistance Project,
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., http://www.cmu.edu/steinbrenner/brownfields/epa-lca-project/index.
html.
148. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, at
66.
149. Catherine Finneran, Attracting Development to Brownfields Sites: A Local Challenge,
PUB. MGMT. MAG., Nov. 2006, available at http://webapps.icma.org/pm/8810/public/cover.cfm?
author=Catherine%20Finneran&title=Attracting%20Development%20To%20Brownfields%20Sit
es%3A %20A%20Local%20Challenge&subtitle.
150. Id.
151. Charles Bartsch, Financing Brownfield Cleanup and Development, GOVERNMENT
FINANCE REVIEW, 27 (February 2002), http://www.gfoa.org/downloads/FinancingBrownfield
CleanupandRedevelopment_OOO.pdf(describing available federal and state resources).
152. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, at
13-14.
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other tools to address brownfields sites. 153 These resources include grant
programs for characterization of brownfields sites, and site analytical tools
that can help make the process of environmental investigation and
remediation less onerous and costly. 154
The EPA's Brownfields
Assessment Grants are available to "inventory, characterize, assess, and
conduct planning and community involvement related to brownfields
sites." 155
Once a site has been selected for analysis, the use of
comprehensive site analytical tools such as the EPA's Triad approach can
streamline environmental investigation and cut remediation costs. 156 The
EPA's brownfields website cites a number of redevelopment "Success
Stories" linked to its brownfields programs. 157
Other federal agencies support site redevelopment activities, 158 and
agencies are teaming together to address brownfields, with the HUD-DOTEPA Interagency Partnership for Sustainable Communities (formed in
2009) serving as a notable example. 159 Federal programs on infrastructure
and housing and community development are adapting to promote site
redevelopment and reuse. 160 A particular focus is the link between
brownfields redevelopment and economic growth. 161 Brownfields Job
Training Grants, part of the $100 million that the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act made available to the EPA, 162 are an example of this
trend. Brownfields redevelopment is a source of "green jobs," linking

153. Brownfields and Land Revitalization, U.S. EPA (Feb. 3, 2011), http://web.archive.org/
web/20110203132536/http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/about.htm (accessed by searching for
www.epa.gov/brownfields/about.htm in the Internet Archive index).
154. Id.
155. Assessment Pilots/Grants, U.S. EPA, (last updated Sept. 29, 2010), http://epa.gov/
brownfields/assessment_grants.htm.
156. See Brownfield Site Contamination Investigation, supra note 81, at 5 ("The Triad
approach is useful for Brownfield sites because it considers the whole site (not just Area of
Concern focuses), [and] is flexible (can be adjusted to unexpected conditions) and integrates all
stakeholders into the site decision making process .... ").
157. Brownfields Success Stories, U.S. EPA, (last updated Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/
swerosps/bf/success/.
158. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, at
13.
159. HUD-DOT-EPA Partnership for Sustainable Communities, U.S. EPA (last updated Sept.
18, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/partnership/index.html.
160. See SARNI,supranote97, at 57.
161. Id. at 57-58.
162. Of the $100 million available under the ARRA, the EPA used $6.8 million for job
training. Brownfields Program Activities Under the Recovery Act, U.S. EPA (last updated April 5,
2012), http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/eparecovery/; Legislation & Policy: Stimulus Status
Report, NAT'L BROWNFIELD Ass'N, http://www.brownfieldassociation.org/News/Default.
aspx#Congress.
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greentech such as renewable
construction with job creation. 163
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energy sources and green building

Table 1
Selected Brownfields Financial Assistance Programs 164
Program/Incentive

Level of
Government

rownfields
xpensing
ax Incentive

ederal

istoric
ehabilitation
ax Credits

ederal

ax-increment
inancing (TIP)
guarantees

Description

Notes

Hows the developer eauthorized
o deduct
hrough
environmental
ecember, 2011
leanup costs in the
ear that they are
· curred, rather than
capitalize them over
4.7 billion in
ork at 1,044
ites in 2009
roperties & for
Source: National
ehabilitation of non- ark Service)
ertified sites
estoration of

States

Guarantees stream of
increased property
axesthatrepayTIP
onds

xample:
ennsylvania TIP
uarantee
rogram

163. SARNI, supra note 97, at 58. See VAN JONES, THE GREEN COLLAR ECONOMY 191
(2008) (discussing this trend).
164. This Table is derived from programs described in A Guide to Federal Tax Incentives for
Brownfields Redevelopment, U.S. EPA (2011), www.epa.gov/brownfields/tax/tax_guide.pdf
[hereinafter EPA Tax Incentives].
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The availability of public funding can be critical to brownfields
redevelopment, and project success often "depends on the extent that public
investments leverage private funds." 166 Public funding is especially
important when site assessment and remediation costs exceed current
property values, 167 which front-loads the developer's investment. 168 As the
New Jersey program's shortfall illustrates, continued public investment is
not always guaranteed in the current tight budgetary climate. 169 This is a
serious threat to future brownfields remediation and reuse projects.

165. In New Jersey, these funds come from the HSDRF, the program underfunded in 2011.
Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund, supra note 143.
166. See EPA, INVESTING IN PARTNERSHIP, POSSIBILITY, AND PEOPLE, supra note 6, at 33.
See also U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, supra note 64, at 11 ("Cities were asked to identify the most
useful tools to redevelop brownfield sites. The top four, in order, were: EPA Assessment Funding,
Private Sector Investment, EPA Clean-Up Funds, and State programs such as the State Voluntary
Clean-Up Programs.").
167. NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL Gov'r PROF' LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 5.
168. See U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, supra note 64, at 11; EPA, INVESTING IN PARTNERSHIP,
POSSIBILITY, AND PEOPLE, supra note 6, at 33-34.
169. EPA Tax Incentives, supra note 164, at 24; NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL GOV'TPROF'LS. &
NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 7.
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Brownfields remediation activities do not eliminate all risks, in part
due to relaxed cleanup standards. As the brownfields history grows longer,
there may be problematic sites if states do not have aggressive provisions
for revisiting cleanups. 170 The efficacy of some brownfields cleanups has
come under fire years afterwards as contamination has been discovered. 171
In one notorious example in New Jersey, the "Kiddie Kollege" day care
center built on a former brownfield turned out to be situated on
contaminated land. 172
States typically protect against backsliding with reopeners in VCPs that
allow state environmental departments to require additional cleanup
activities at a later date if changed conditions warrant it. 173 These reopeners
have several drawbacks. In a system such as New Jersey's post-2009 Site
Remediation Program, the state has no involvement with the site in its
initial cleanup, 174 so it is unlikely to be vigilant in discovering postremediation flaws. Also, reopeners in VCPs tend to be limited to
intervening to prevent imminent harm, as any broader provision is typically
perceived as a deterrent to the initial entry into a VCP (although one
empirical study has found that few sites are reopened and the fear is largely
unwarranted 175).
One study suggests that "reopener rates may increase with more
vigorous enforcement and over the passage of time," 176 but it seems more
likely that fewer sites will be addressed in the future. Any reopener
provision depends both on resources available in the future to state
environmental agencies, and on the willingness of those agencies to tackle
problems at sites they believed were successfully addressed in the past. The
problem of resources to devote to enforcement is especially problematic in
tight budgetary climates, as cutbacks in state budgets can lead to a slower
170. WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON, supra note 26, at 2, 12 (noting
that "more opportunities for reopeners will arise as site histories lengthen at voluntarily
remediated sites"); Pendergrass, supra note 63, at 1308-09 (discussing the need to audit sites with
institutional controls).
171. See Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 216-217.
172. Rath, supra note 2, at 338-39, and Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 744-45,
discuss this and other sites involving the New Jersey site remediation programs.
173. See John Pendergrass et al., Quantifying Long-Term Environmental Regulatory Risk for
Brownjields: Are Reopeners Really an Issue?, 46 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 257 (2003) .
. 174. See Maro, supra note 20, at 159.
175. See Pendergrass et al., supra note 173, at 257 (noting that "among the 46 states with
VCPs, only 12 cases were reopened out of 11,497 closed environmental cases, a reopener rate of
between 0.1 % and 0.2%").
176. Id.
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pace of cleanups and less vigilant oversight of brownfields sites. 177 State
environmental agencies have been paring back the resources they devote to
enforcement generally, and New Jersey is no exception. 178 With limited
resources, few state environmental agencies will prioritize oversight and
monitoring of completed brownfields sites ahead of ongoing enforcement
actions.
IV. CONCLUSION

"Finality" is elusive in brownfields redevelopment. Decades after their
inception, brownfields redevelopment programs are mature environmental
programs with many successes. However, closing the book on brownfields
means much more than simply assessing whether remediation at some
individual brownfields sites has been successful. Given the original
preoccupation with shining a light on these neglected sites and getting them
back into the stream of commerce, finality would mean that all of them
have been inventoried, investigated, and remediated if needed. Moreover,
the focus on initial cleanups comes at the expense of monitoring sites and
assessing long-term results, all of which need increased attention. If states
discover contamination more significant than originally present, they must
address it. In addition, major societal developments in the two decades
since "brownfields" first entered the nation's vocabulary, particularly the
growth of the environmental justice movement and the increased focus on
addressing climate change, have shown the limitations of VCPs' parcel-byparcel, developer-centered approach.
The specter of federal liability may be less significant than it once was,
and VCPs have been responsible for many successes, but the final verdict
on brownfields programs has yet to be rendered.

177. See EPA, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS, supra note 8,
at l; Eisen, Brownfields Policies/or Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 216.
178. Rath, supra note 2, at 342-43 (describing the funding cutbacks and deregulatory
legislation that have decreased the state's role in waste remediation).

